WHITE PAPER
Updated on : Monday, 08 December, 2025
Released on: Monday, 01 December, 2025
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Why Rushing a November Election and Unprepared Electronic Result Transmission Threaten Nigeria's Democracy
Prepared for Stakeholders Responsible for Electoral Governance, Policy Oversight, and Democratic Processes in Nigeria
INTRODUCTION
Nigeria stands at a defining crossroads. Electoral reform is necessary, and technology can strengthen our democracy—but only when thoughtfully introduced, transparently tested, and backed by infrastructure that is resilient, secure, and professionally governed.
Today, two major proposals are before the National Assembly:
1. Shifting future general elections to November, and
2. Making electronic transmission of results by BVAS a legal mandate, rather than an operational guideline.
These proposals are significant. Yet, in their current form, they carry risks capable of undermining electoral credibility rather than improving it—especially because the internet infrastructure required for electronic transmission is not controlled by INEC, the body responsible for elections.
The BOOT Party, wishes to present this white paper to your office and lawmakers with a clear warning: If we fail to address these technical, legal, and operational gaps, the proposed reforms may create a perfect storm of disenfranchisement, confusion, and contestation.
1. THE NOVEMBER ELECTION DATE: A HIGH-RISK CHOICE
1.1 November is Still a Flood-Prone Month
For southern and riverine states—Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers, Cross River, Akwa Ibom, parts of Ondo and Lagos—the rainy season often extends into October and November. Floods regularly destroy roads, isolate communities, disrupt transport, and displace voters.
Moving elections to November means:
• Polling materials may not reach thousands of polling units
• BVAS devices may be exposed to moisture, power instability, and transport barriers
• Entire local governments may be inaccessible on election day
• Turnout could decline unevenly, creating regional disenfranchisement
1.2 "Early Voting" in the Bill Excludes the Nigerian Public
The bill proposes special-day voting—but only for:
• Security personnel
• INEC staff
• Essential workers
This is not the early voting system used by countries that protect citizens from weather disruption.
The general electorate receives no early voting option.
Thus, November elections could suppress turnout for millions while offering no compensatory early-voting mechanism.
2. THE 2023 BVAS EXPERIENCE MAKES CAUTION NECESSARY
In 2023, INEC introduced:
• BVAS for accreditation and result imaging
• IReV for result upload and public access
These were guidelines, not legal mandates.
Yet the deployment saw:
• Outages
• Device failures
• Inconsistent network coverage
• Delayed uploads
• Public distrust fueled by unclear technical explanations
Instead of resolving these issues, the new bill proposes to elevate electronic transmission into law—binding the entire system to internet infrastructure that INEC does not own, control, secure, or manage.
This is a dangerous mismatch.
3. THE CORE DANGER: INEC DOES NOT CONTROL INTERNET INFRASTRUCTURE
3.1 Electronic Transmission Depends on:
• Mobile network operators (MNO) like MTN, Glo, Airtel, 9mobile.
• Internet exchange points
• Fibre backbones
• Satellite and microwave links in remote areas
• Spectrum allocation policies
• Cybersecurity standards for telecom operators
None of these are managed by INEC.
3.2 National Communication Commission (NCC)—not INEC—Governs:
• Network quality of service
• Service reliability
• Spectrum and base-station deployment
• Security compliance standards
• Disaster preparedness in telecom networks
3.3 Mobile Networks are Vulnerable to Outages, Congestion, and Device Compromise
CERT-FR's 2025 global threat assessment shows:
• Mobile devices are high-value attack targets
• Supply chain attacks are increasing
• Network-layer compromise is possible
• Criminals and state actors actively exploit mobile vulnerabilities
BVAS is a mobile-based device depending on networks subject to these threats.
3.4 If the Law Mandates Electronic Transmission but Does Not Mandate Infrastructure Obligations for NCC and MNOs:
Nigeria risks:
• Partial transmission
• Network-based disenfranchisement in rural or flood-affected areas
• Device manipulation or denial-of-service attacks
• Legal crises from missing, late, or corrupted uploads
• A repeat or worse version of the 2023 credibility challenge
Electronic transmission cannot be guaranteed unless infrastructure providers are legally bound to provide the required uptime, security, and nationwide readiness.
4. WHAT THE PROPOSED LAW MUST CLARIFY TO AVOID DISASTER
1. NCC must be legally responsible for ensuring telecom networks meet election-day reliability and security standards.
2. MNOs must be mandated to:
• Provide priority traffic channels for INEC
• Guarantee minimum network availability in all polling units
• Publish pre-election coverage mapping and live status portals
3. Infrastructure failures must trigger clearly defined contingency mechanisms, not ad hoc improvisation.
4. The law must specify who is accountable when transmission fails—INEC, NCC, or the MNOs.
5.INEC's technical limits must be explicitly recognized; the body should not be blamed for failures caused by telecom infrastructure outside its control.
6. In the event of any inconsistency, conflict, or discrepancy between the manually recorded polling-unit result and the electronically transmitted result for the same polling unit, which is the source of truth.
Failing to define these responsibilities means INEC will be legally bound to deliver a process it does not technically control—a formula for post-election crisis.
5. A UNIFIED TECHNICAL CHECKLIST
(For INEC, NCC, Mobile Network Operators, and Lawmakers)
A. For Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)
• Complete independent cybersecurity audits of BVAS, IReV, and firmware
• Conduct national mock elections with full transparency
• Publish device supply-chain documentation
• Ensure all devices have offline, verifiable, cryptographically signed storage
• Maintain paper EC8A as the legal ground truth
• Publish polling-unit readiness certification before election day
• Establish real-time technical incident dashboards accessible to observers
B. For National Communication Commission (NCC)
• Define election-day Quality of Service (QoS) thresholds
• Mandate mobile operators to build election-priority channels
• Enforce redundancy requirements (dual fibre routes, microwave backup)
• Require pre-election network tests in all polling units
• Publish network outage, congestion, and attack reports
• Oversee election cyber-defence coordination with national CERT teams
C. For Mobile Network Operators (MNOs)
• Provide nationwide coverage maps specifically for polling units
• Create dedicated election traffic lanes with congestion protection
• Ensure backup power at base stations in high-risk zones
• Implement hardening of mobile backhaul infrastructure
• Provide secure SIM and certificate management for BVAS devices
• Maintain 24/7 election engineering support war rooms
D. For Lawmakers
• Write explicit responsibilities for INEC, NCC, and MNOs into law
• Require continuous independent testing before mandating national rollout
• Legally guarantee paper audit trails
• Provide funding for emergency infrastructure in flood zones
• Clarify legal implications for delayed or failed transmissions
• Ensure early voting applies to citizens in flood-affected LGAs—not only special groups.
• Write into law the source of truth in the event of any inconsistency, conflict, or discrepancy between the manually recorded polling-unit result and the electronically transmitted result for the same polling unit.
6. CONCLUSION: NIGERIA MUST NOT SWAP ONE PROBLEM FOR ANOTHER
Technology can strengthen our elections, but technology deployed without due diligence weakens them.
A November election exposes millions to logistical and weather risks.
A legally mandated electronic transmission system—dependent on fragile, untested public internet infrastructure—exposes the entire country to technical and cyber security risks.
Nigeria must not legislate enthusiasm.
Nigeria must legislate competence, preparedness, and accountability.
As the BOOT Party, we call for:
• A safer election date
• Clear, enforceable obligations for all infrastructure providers
• Transparent testing
• Realistic timelines
• And a credible system that Nigerians can trust
Democracy is not strengthened by speed.
Democracy is strengthened by reliability, fairness, and public confidence.
Submitted by:
Because Of Our Tomorrow (BOOT) Party
Yours sincerely,
Sonny Adenuga
National Chairman
Because Of Our Tomorrow (BOOT) Party
@SonnyAdenuga
The BOOT Party is a cooperative-like political leadership system.
@TheBOOTParty
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Signed
BOOT Party! @TheBOOTParty
Because Of Our Tomorrow
The BOOT Party is a cooperative-like political leadership system.
Send Feedback
WhatsApp: +234-705-774-9595
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Join BOOT Party and Get Involved!
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Vote in BOOT Party Election Primaries
Donate Because Nigeria Matters
